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2The central role of the government in the economy and the associated high
marginal tax rates mean that the problems of taxing and spending will continue to
provide challenging opportunities for research in public economics.
– Feldstein (1997, p. 325)
I. INTRODUCTION
Mendoza et al. (1997, p. 109) emphasize that constructing variables to accurately
measure tax policy parameters is a primary concern in empirical research concerning the growth
impacts of tax policy. In this paper we propose an improved way to estimate marginal tax rates
(MTR’s) for U.S. states. Economic theory suggests that MTR’s play a role, perhaps the most
important role, in influencing the behaviour of economic agents. As corroborating evidence,
several studies have identified an empirical link between MTR’s and economic growth (Mullen
and Williams, 1994; Becsi, 1996; Padovano and Galli, 2002).1 In a similar vein, Yamarik (2000)
argues that improved measures of MTR’s are important for understanding the distortionary nature
of state tax policy. Unfortunately, the estimation of MTR’s is problematic given the monumental
task required to track and quantify the diverse and changing tax polices across states.
Most studies that estimate state MTR’s adopt the procedure developed in Koester and
Kormendi’s (K&K, 1989) cross-country analysis of economic growth. Given annual
observations of tax revenues and state income over time period t = 1,2,…T, they estimate the
regression specification:
(1) ststs1s0st IncomeRevenuesTax   ,, ; t = 1,2,…T.
The estimate of s1, is taken as a measure of a given state’s marginal tax rate.
This specification has also been used to measure state-specific tax progressivity. If
0s0 , , the state’s average tax rate (ATR) will be less than its marginal rate, and the average
1 Lee and Gordon’s (2005) results, however, suggest that the robustness of the link hinges on the empirical
specification employed.
3will rise as income increases. Such reasoning has led researchers such as Becsi (1996) and Crain
(2003) to conclude that most state tax systems are progressive.2
One limitation of the K&K approach is that a single MTR is estimated for the entire
sample period for each state. This precludes the use of MTR’s as an explanatory variable in
panel data studies – a significant deficiency for panel analysis.3 Another problem is that MTR’s
estimated using the K&K approach are disconnected from actual tax parameters, such as
statutory tax rates or tax base definitions. To address these and other shortcomings, researchers
have employed alternative variables, such as the statutory tax rate for the top income tax bracket,
or the change in average tax rates (ATR’s) (e.g., Mullen and Williams, 1994; Gemmell, Kneller,
and Sanz, 2008).4 As discussed below, these have significant shortcomings as well.
Our paper contributes to the literature by developing an empirical procedure for
estimating MTR’s that directly incorporates changes in tax policy parameters. To implement our
procedure, we assemble a comprehensive data base of state statutory tax parameters for each US
state from 1977 to 2004. We decompose state and local total tax revenues into component tax
source categories and estimate separate regressions for each type. This has the benefit of
allowing time-varying MTR estimates that reflect actual changes in statutory tax parameters for
each tax category.
We proceed as follows: Section II presents our empirical strategy for estimating state
MTR’s. Section III reports and discusses our estimates of state-specific, time-varying MTR’s.
2 Other studies, using the same methodology but different time periods, conclude that state tax systems are
moderately regressive on average (e.g. Mullen and Williams, 1994).
3 Wasylenko (1997) discusses the limitation of using a fixed effect in panel studies of the impact of taxes on
economic growth – the implicit assumption is that there is no regime change (p. 43).
4 Mendoza et al. (1997) discuss problems with typical tax measures. They measure effective aggregated tax rates
across countries using revenue statistics and national accounts.
4Section IV calculates individual, state tax progressivities from the MTR results. Section V
concludes with suggestions for future work.
II. A PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING STATE-SPECIFIC MTR’S
The K&K approach to estimating MTR’s can be represented by the following regression
specification:
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where D is a dummy variable that equals 1 for state s and zero otherwise. State-specific MTR’s
are calculated by the respective estimated slope coefficients.
Our contribution is twofold: First, similar to Yamarik (2000), we estimate separate
regressions for component tax categories.5 Specifically, we decompose Total State and Local
(S&L) Tax Revenues into five categories: (i) Personal Income Tax (PIT) Revenues, (ii)
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) Revenues, (iii) General Sales Tax (ST) Revenues; (iv) Property Tax
(PT) Revenues, and (v) Other Tax (OT) Revenues.6 Second, we append the K&K (and Yamarik)
approach by including a set of statutory tax variables for each tax type except Other Taxes.
This produces the following specification for tax type i, state s, and fiscal year t:
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5 Yamarik (2000) uses the K&K approach to estimate MTR’s for three categories: gross state product, personal
income and general sales. He uses average tax rate as a proxy for property tax rates. He concludes that
disaggregated MTR’s are better measures for use in growth studies.
6 For our analysis, “Other Taxes” is the residual defined as (Total S&L Tax Revenues) – (PIT + CIT + ST + PT). It
equals the Census categories “Selective Sales,” “Motor Vehicle License” and “Other Taxes”.
5where i=PIT, CIT, ST, PT, and OT and identifies the respective tax type; Ki indicates the number
of statutory tax variables included in the ith tax type regression; and Ri is a subset of Ki and
represents the number of statutory tax rate variables. The latter term captures potential
interactions between tax rates and income.7 (See TABLE 2 and the discussion below for a
description of the statutory tax parameters used for each tax revenue regression).
Estimation Strategy
A number of things should be noted about this specification. First, it includes the K&K
specification as a special case. Further, we only include tax parameters that are directly related
to the respective tax type in the separate regressions. For example, we do not include the sales
tax parameters in the estimation of the PIT revenue equation.8 Finally, as a point of departure
from typical studies, we use Personal Income data based on fiscal year – as opposed to calendar
year – to appropriately match income with tax revenue data.9
Our data include all 50 states over the years 1977-2004, excluding the years 2001 and
2003 for which state and local fiscal data were not available.10 This limits our sample to a
maximum of 1300 total observations. In TABLE 1 we report shares of total tax revenues by
7 We also investigate potential interaction between the statutory tax base parameters and income for each set of
regressions. These are problematic due to the potential of endogeneity of tax policy changes and tax base definitions
as discussed below. The core estimates on the income coefficients are robust to including these income-tax base
interaction terms. Consequently, we do not report results with the income interaction terms.
8 One could make an argument for including tax parameters from other revenue sources. For example, it is possible
that differences between income and corporate income tax rates affect the respective tax bases, which figure into
total tax revenues from these two sources. The danger of including additional tax parameters is the likelihood of
picking up spurious correlations. Our analysis found several cases of statistically significant tax coefficients that
could not be supported by theory. Accordingly, we chose to adopt a conservative approach in specifying our tax
revenue equations.
9 Most studies use annual data on state Personal Income (or GSP) as the Income variable in Equation (3)-type
specifications. This causes a mismatch between the left-hand variables (tax revenues are calculated over fiscal years)
and right-hand variables (personal Income is based on calendar years). We use quarterly BEA data to construct an
annual Personal Income variable that matches the state’s fiscal year.
10 The tax and revenue data come from US Census Government Finances Historical Data. These are available for
state and local governments in 1972, and then from 1977 onward.
6type of tax over the sample period. Property Taxes comprise the largest share of total State and
Local tax revenues (30.3%), followed by Sales Taxes (23.5%), Other Taxes (23.3%), Personal
Income Taxes (18.5%), and Corporate Income Taxes (4.3%).
Some of the states do not collect revenues from all sources as reflected by minimum
values of 0 in TABLE 1. Our estimation procedure omits states that do not use the respective
revenue source because these states do not contribute information about the relationship between
revenues, income, and tax parameters. For example, the seven states which had no PIT revenue
during this period (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming)
were excluded when estimating the PIT revenue equation.11 A similar procedure was followed in
estimating the CIT and ST regressions.12
Unlike the state-specific Income coefficients (represented by the s's1, ), the statutory tax
parameter coefficients (the s'2 and s'3 ) represent average effects across all states. This
specification is dictated by the limited number of observations per state and the infrequency of
changes in many of the tax parameters over the sample period.13 Such a combination may
produce spurious correlations. For example, it is possible that a state makes a small change in its
sales tax rate at the same time that it experiences a very large increase in sales tax revenues;
producing a large, but spurious, estimate of the effect of that tax variable on revenues. As a
compromise, we estimate an average effect across all states. The assertion underlying our
specification is that the experience of all states has something to say about the relationship
between the respective tax parameters and tax revenues for any one state. This approach enables
11 Alaska had a personal income tax for the first two years of the sample (1977 and 1978). We chose to omit these
observations in the estimation of the PIT equation.
12 Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do not have Corporate Income Taxes. Alaska, Delaware, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Oregon do not have Sales Taxes.
13 The number of observations per state will depend on data availability and whether the state imposed that type of
tax during the sample period 1977-2004 excluding 2001 and 2003.
7us to incorporate potentially important changes in tax policies while at the same time minimizing
the risk of spurious correlations from individual states.
Statutory Tax Parameters
We went to exhaustive efforts to assemble data on as many statutory tax parameters as
possible for each tax revenue component. Our efforts were hindered by the diversity in the
statutory tax laws, the need to collect historical data, and the lack of centralized collection
location for the various types of taxes and tax structures. Nevertheless, we did succeed in
collecting data on most of the pertinent tax parameters for each type of tax for each state and
year in our analysis. These are listed and briefly described in TABLE 2.
The statutory tax parameters associated with the Personal Income Tax (PIT) are derived
from the NBER TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) and consist of two sets of
variables: (i) MTR’s averaged over the distribution of taxpayers (MTR_WAGES,
MTR_INTEREST, MTR_DIVIDENDS, MTR_CAPGAINS, MTR_MORTGAGE, and
MTR_PENSION), and (ii) maximum tax rates (MAX_WAGES, and MAX_CAPGAINS). A danger
in using “average” MTR’s is that they change with the distribution of income. We address this
problem by choosing the NBER TAXSIM AMTR-N95 calculations. These assume the same
distribution of income for all states and time periods.14 This represents the best option for
ensuring that changes in the TAXSIM MTR variables represent changes in statutory tax
parameters, rather than changes in income distribution. We expect all of these tax parameters to
be positively related to PIT revenues.
14 The NBER TAXSIM model calculates average marginal tax rates using three approaches. The N95 approach
calculates average marginal tax rates assuming an income distribution that is the same for all states and all years –
fixed to a representative national income distribution for 1995. See Table 3 at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-
marginal/. This approach insures that any differences in average marginal tax rates across states and years is a result
of differences in tax policy parameters, and not differences in income across states and/or time periods.
8Our data include two statutory tax parameters for the Corporate Income Tax: the
maximum rate (MAX_CRATE) and the number of tax brackets (NUMBER_CBRACKETS).
Assuming a positive tax rate elasticity, we expect that the number of tax brackets will be
negatively related to CIT revenues when the maximum rate is held constant.
We collected five statutory tax parameters for the Sales Tax (ST). These consist of the
state general sales tax rate (RATE_SALES), the state tax rate on food (RATE_FOOD), and three
variables that characterize the sales tax base. EXTENT_SERVICESTAXED is a count variable
that tracks the number of service good categories included in the state sales tax base.
EXTENT_MACHINERY1 and EXTENT_MACHINERY2 are dummy variables that identify
whether machinery is taxed broadly or narrowly, respectively.15
The statutory treatment of Property Taxes (PT) is characterized by four parameters. We
collected state effective property rates (RATE_PROPERTY) from a yearly survey of the largest
cities in each state conducted by the District of Columbia Office of Revenue Analysis. The
effective rate is calculated as the product of the nominal rate and the assessment level expressed
per $100. Collected only for the largest city in each state, these rates do not measure the state-
wide average nor do they necessarily reflect the property tax rate for the median household
within or across states. They also do not incorporate the variety of exemptions and credits that
impact the taxable property tax base. However, given the infeasibility of collecting rate and base
data from each taxing jurisdiction within all states over time, these data serve as valuable proxies
for the status of property taxation across states. We also include variables indicating whether a
state limits growth in assessment rates (LIMIT_ASSESSGROWTH), property tax limits by
specific entities such as school districts (LIMIT_SPECIFICRATE), and limits the growth rate of
15 See Merriman and Skidmore (2000) for a discussion of the distortionary nature of sales tax parameters.
9property tax liabilities (LIMIT_REVGROWTH). LIMIT_ASSESSGROWTH and
LIMIT_SPECIFICRATE are interacted in the regression specification.16
State-specific MTR Estimates
State-specific MTR estimates are derived from the individual tax revenue regression
equations. The estimated MTR associated with tax type i is given by:
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where the estimated coefficients come from estimation of Equation (3). The terms in
parentheses can be thought of representing the K&K approach. The terms outside the
parentheses capture time-varying behaviour in the MTR as a result of changes in statutory tax
parameters. The overall MTR is obtained by summing across all 5 tax types:
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III. DISCUSSION OF MTR RESULTS
Core Results for Tax Revenue Regressions
We present in TABLE 3 a summary of our core regression results for each revenue
source. (The Other Tax regression equation is not reported since it does not include any
statutory tax variables.) Note that each regression equation uses a different number of
observations, because some states do not implement the respective revenue source and because
16 During periods of housing price increases, property tax rate limits alone are ineffective at constraining property
tax revenue growth. However, rate limits coupled with assessment growth limits can be very restrictive. We
therefore interact the assessment growth limit variable with the rate limit variable to create one variable since both
are essential for determining property tax liabilities over time. See Skidmore (1999) for a more detailed discussion.
An additional variable characterizing limits on overall property rates had to be dropped because of perfect
multicollinearity with other included variables.
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of missing data.17 For the sake of brevity, the table only reports the estimates of the statutory tax
rate-income interaction variables, since these are the only statutory tax variables that matter for
generating the MTR’s. Also included in these regressions are state dummy and state dummy-
income interaction variables, along with statutory, non-rate tax variables.18
In assessing the reliability of these regression results, we note that the regression
equations generally produce good fits, with R2 values 97% or higher. The product of the
estimated coefficient and the associated tax variable should be interpreted as the change in the
respective tax revenues resulting from a dollar increase in state Personal Income. For example,
if we evaluate the coefficient on MTR_WAGESxINCOME at the sample average for
MTR_WAGES, a dollar increase in state Personal Income is estimated to increase PIT revenues
by approximately 1.7 cents (0.0039464.20=0.017) via taxation on wage income.
The relative sizes of the coefficients are in line with expectations: One would expect a
percentage point increase in the tax rate on wages (MTR_WAGES) to have a larger impact on PIT
revenues than a percentage point increase in the tax rate on capital gains or a percentage point
decrease in the tax subsidy for mortgage interest (MTR_CAPGAINS, MTR_MORTGAGE).
Likewise, one would expect a percentage point increase in the general sales tax (RATE_SALES)
to have a larger impact on total ST revenues than the same increase on food (RATE_FOOD).
A potentially serious econometric issue is that the policy variables included in our
analyses are endogenously determined. For example, states experiencing rapid growth in
property tax revenues are likely to be the same states that support legislation to restrain property
taxes. Similarly states experiencing disappointing growth in sales tax revenues may respond by
expanding the coverage of their sales tax regimes. As a last example, states with large increases
17 Property tax rates were not available for some of the states from 1977-1980, and state and local tax revenue data
were unavailable for all states for 2001 and 2003.
18 The set of regression results are available from the authors upon request.
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in taxable revenues are also more likely to cut tax rates (Poterba, 1994). The issue of
endogeneity is difficult to overcome. In our case we are hamstrung by a lack of good
instruments to determine whether endogeneity is present, and if so, to use in appropriate
econometric methods.19
The presence of endogeneity is likely to cause our estimates in TABLE 3 to be
conservative estimates of the effects of statutory tax variables on MTR’s. We expect the bias to
be in the opposite direction of the true tax effects. For example, the endogeneity bias associated
with MTR_WAGES should be negative if states with increasing taxable incomes are more likely
to lower tax rates (Poterba, 1994). This would make the true value of the MTR_WAGES
coefficient larger than the estimated value reported in TABLE 3. The same goes for the other
statutory tax rate coefficients reported in TABLE 3. In this sense, our results can be thought of
representing conservative estimates of the effects of tax policy parameters on MTR’s: Correctly-
signed coefficients are biased towards zero. Future research may be able to fashion a better
solution to the endogeneity problem. In the meantime, we believe this represents a substantial
improvement on the K&K approach, which implicitly sets all statutory tax coefficients equal to
zero.
State and Year Specific MTR Estimates
We use Equations (4) and (5) above to calculate state- and year-specific MTR’s. TABLE
4 summarizes the distribution of estimates. The mean and median values of MTR are 10.45%
and 10.28%, respectively. These are very close to the mean value of Average Tax Rate
19 For a good survey of some of the econometric issues, see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002).
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(calculated as
st
st
st Income
RevenuesTaxL&STotal
ATR  ) for this sample.20 The individual values
range from a minimum of 7.93% to a maximum of 15.23%. We discuss the state-by-state results
in more detail below.
Panel B of TABLE 4 decomposes the level of MTR’s by revenue source. Overall, the
respective MTR shares are similar to their shares of overall tax revenues (cf. TABLE 1).
However, these MTR shares mask much of the heterogeneity across states. For example, MTR’s
for PIT and ST are zero in states that do not use these revenue sources and reach as high as 5.6%
(New York) and 5.1% (Washington), respectively. MTRPT ranges from a low of 1.3% (Alabama)
to a high of 6.2% (Maine). MTROT ranges from 1.0% (Massachusetts) to 5.2% (Delaware).
A different story emerges if we decompose changes in MTR’s. Panel C of TABLE 4
reports mean and median values of the annual change of the respective MTR components which
have time-varying statutory components.21 Changes in MTRPIT contribute the largest share of
annual movement in overall MTR’s. The average of the absolute value of the annual change in
MTRPIT is 0.051 percent which is approximately 3 times larger than the next largest contributor,
Sales Taxes. The difference is striking given that both tax types make roughly equal
contributions to the level of MTR’s (cf. Panel B).
The reason for this discrepancy is that state sales taxes change much less frequently than
personal income tax parameters. The median of the absolute value of annual changes in MTRST
is zero; i.e., no change (cf. Panel C). A similar story holds for property taxes. Thus, while all
the tax types except corporate income taxes contribute substantially to differences in the
20 Income is based on the fiscal year for the ATR calculation.
21 Note that the change in MTROT is always zero, since it employs no time-varying, statutory tax information.
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estimated MTR’s across states, most of the movement of MTR’s within states is due to changes in
PIT parameters.
Comparison of MTR estimates with K&K
TABLE 5 reports state-by-state, time-series of two estimates of MTR’s. The solid line
represents our estimates. The dotted line represents the time-invariant estimates using the K&K
procedure (cf. Equation (2)). Some states have missing MTR values for the years 1977-1980 due
to the unavailability of property tax rates for these years and states.
Our estimated MTR’s are generally close, in level, to the K&K MTR’s, though there are
some differences. For example, our estimated MTR for New York is much larger than that of
K&K. Conversely, we estimate a much lower MTR for Wyoming. We also estimate substantial
time-varying MTR’s for a number of states. An examination of the causes of the time-varying
behaviour in MTR’s reveals that much of the within-state movement is driven by changes in two
tax policy parameters: (i) the TAXSIM-generated variable, MTR_WAGES, working through
MTRPIT, and (ii) the state sales tax variable, RATE_SALES, working through MTRST.
TABLE 6 reports the time series values of these two variables for Connecticut, Illinois,
Kentucky, and North Carolina. Abrupt changes in these rates are identified by the boxed cells in
the table. A comparison with TABLE 5 shows that they correspond in timing to abrupt changes
in the estimated MTR’s for these states. For example, the sharp increase in Connecticut’s MTR’s
in the early 1990s can be traced to changes in its income tax code. Connecticut’s income tax was
broadened to include wages in 1991 at an initial tax rate of 1.5%. This rate tripled the following
year to 4.5%. Illinois provides an example where an abrupt change in its MTR is related to its
14
sales tax. In 1990, Illinois increased its sales tax rate from 5.0% to 6.25%, effective January 1,
1991.
The large increase in Kentucky’s MTR from 1990 to 1991 can be attributed to
simultaneous changes in both its income and sales tax rates. The deduction for federal income
taxes was eliminated in 1991. At the same time, the sales tax was increased from 5 to 6% in
1991. Finally, North Carolina provides an example of a number of tax changes that combined to
increase its MTR from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. North Carolina had major tax reform in
1989. The federal income tax was adopted as a starting point to calculate North Carolina
obligations. Changes to the tax brackets amounted to a tax increase and the rate structure was
streamlined to include just two rates: 6% and 7%. In 1991, the state faced budget difficulties and
added a third rate of 7.75%. In 1992, the state sales tax rate was increased from 3 to 4%.
Evaluating Proxies for Time-Varying MTR’s
The preceding discussion highlights one of the advantages to our procedure: it allows
time-varying behaviour in estimated MTR’s to reflect changes in underlying statutory tax
parameters. Previous studies attempt to capture such movements using proxies. Two standard
proxies for time-varying MTR’s are (i) the top marginal income tax rate, and (ii) changes in Tax
Burden (cf. Mullen and Williams, 1994).22
We present TABLE 7 to address the question of how well these proxies correlate with
our estimated MTR values. We calculate simple correlations for the respective pairs of variables,
without and with adjustments for state fixed effects. We find correlations of 0.62 and 0.52
22 Tax Burden is typically calculated as the ratio of Total State and Local Tax Revenues to income, where income is
based on the calendar year at that ends during the corresponding fiscal year (Reed and Rogers, 2006, p 408). Mullen
and Williams (1994) use a modified Tax Burden measure calculated as a state’s ATR divided by the mean ATR for
the sample. Generally, ATR and Tax Burden are used interchangeably. For our purposes, however, we distinguish
them by tracking income by the fiscal year for ATR and by calendar year for Tax Burden.
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between the top marginal income tax rate and our estimated MTR’s (i) in the panel (Column 1)
and (ii) in the time-series with the cross-sectional effects subtracted out (Column 2),
respectively. In other words, approximately a quarter to a third of the variance in our estimated
MTR’s can be “explained” with this one variable, depending on whether one is using fixed
effects. Whether these variables qualify as acceptable proxies is questionable.
In contrast, changes in Tax Burden are very poorly correlated with our estimated time-
varying MTR’s. The simple correlations without and with adjustments for fixed effects are 0.05
and 0.08, respectively. Clearly, this variable should not be used as a proxy for state-specific
MTR’s in a panel setting. This supports Reed and Rogers’ (2006) conclusion that Tax Burden
measures do a poor job of capturing changes in state tax policy.
State MTR Rankings
Understanding the precise nature of the theoretical and empirical links between tax policy
and economic growth continues to stimulate research efforts (Feldstein, 2002, p. 325). Policy
makers pay particular attention to their Tax Burden rankings, which are readily available. In
contrast, accurate measures of MTR’s – which come closer to reflecting behavioural responses to
policy decisions – have been elusive. Both the absolute and relative ranks of MTR’s across states
are useful for gaining such insights. According, we present state-level MTR estimates from our
analysis. Given the substantial changes in MTR’s over time, we focus on the last five years of
our sample, 2000-2004.
Previous research has claimed a link between MTR’s and economic growth (Mullen and
Williams, 1994; Becsi, 1996). For this and other reasons, knowing both the absolute and relative
ranks of MTR’s across states is of interest. Given the substantial changes in MTR’s over time,
16
we focus on the last five years of our sample, 2000-2004. Columns (2) and (3) of TABLE 8
report state-specific, average MTR’s for this period, along with the corresponding ranks. The
five states with the largest average MTR’s over the years 2000-2004 are:
1. New York (14.11%),
2. Maine (14.00%)
3. Hawaii (12.50%)
4. New Mexico (12.46%)
5. Wisconsin (12.38%)
The five states with the smallest average MTR’s over the 2000-2004 period are:
46. Alabama (8.91%)
47. South Dakota (8.79%)
48. Tennessee (8.55%)
49. Wyoming (8.40%)
50. Alaska (8.01%)
For those familiar with such comparisons, this ranking of states by MTR’s should look
generally similar to rankings of state Tax Burdens, with two egregious exceptions. Alaska and
Wyoming have the two lowest MTR’s, but generally rank highest in terms of Tax Burdens. This
discrepancy is attributable to severance taxes, the revenue from which is largely independent of
the state’s own income. When Alaska and Wyoming are omitted, the simple correlation between
average MTR’s and average Tax Burdens across states during 2000-2004 in the remaining
sample is 0.79.23
IV. STATE TAX PROGRESSIVITY IMPLICATIONS
Among the many tax progressivity indices, two have been frequently employed when
measuring tax progressivities for U.S. states (Kiefer, 1984), (i) a measure which compares state
23 Mullen and Williams (1994) find a large (.635) and highly significant simple correlation between their measure of
Tax Burden and a state’s average MTR over the 1969-86 period. Note that these results differ from those reported
in TABLE 7 because they do not incorporate changes over time within states.
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MTR’s and ATR’s, and (ii) a measure based on a weighted average of tax incidence of individual
tax types. We evaluate these approaches using our time-varying MTR estimates.
MTR-ATR Measure of Tax Progressivity
A common approach defines a state’s tax regime as progressive if its MTR is greater than
its ATR. Accordingly, a given state s is defined as progressive in year t if its progressivity index,
given by
(6) Progressivityst =
st
st
ATR
MTR
100 ,
is greater than 100. We use the estimated MTR’s from the previous section to calculate
progressivity indices for each state and year. Panel A of TABLE 9 presents a histogram and
some summary statistics for tax progressivities computed in this latter manner.
With the exception of a few outliers on the low end – Alaska and Wyoming – the
distribution of Progressivity is remarkably symmetric with mean and median values very close to
100. This is even more apparent in Panel B where we omit Alaska and Wyoming.24 Over the
time period 1977-2004, U.S. states were fairly evenly split between progressive and regressive
tax structures, with a large number of state tax systems approximating a proportional tax system.
Compared to previous studies that also measure progressivity by comparing MTR to ATR, these
results are more regressive than Becsi (1996) and Crain (2003), but similar to Mullen and
Williams (1994).25
24 Alaska and Wyoming are unique in their reliance on severance taxes. This has the effect of inflating their ATR’s,
and skewing their progressivity values downward.
25 Using data from 1961-1992, Becsi (1996, Table 2, pages 26f.) estimates that 45 of 50 states have progressive tax
structures. Crain (2003, Table 4.4, page 61) reports that 40 of 50 states are progressive, though his analysis is based
on state taxes only. Mullen and Williams (1994) do not report state-specific estimates, but write that “state-local tax
structures are, on average, slightly regressive” (pages 704f.). All these studies define progressive as MTR > ATR
and estimate MTR’s using the K&K method.
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Columns (4) and (5) of TABLE 8 provide more detail, reporting state-by-state, average
Progressivity for the years 2000-2004, along with their ranks. The five states with the most
progressive tax structures over the years 2000-2004 are:
1. Oregon (109.8)
2. New Mexico (108.5)
3. Connecticut (108.2)
4. Maine (108.1)
5. New Jersey (106.9)
The five states with least progressive (most regressive) tax structures are:
46. Illinois (97.1)
47. California (96.7)
48. Louisiana (94.9)
49. Alaska (71.7)
50. Wyoming (69.9)
Nothing distinctive about the tax structures of these states explains their Progressivity rankings.
The most progressive states employ both income and sales taxes; as do the most regressive states
– other than Alaska and Wyoming. As noted above, Alaska and Wyoming are exceptions,
because their regressivity is primarily driven by their exceptionally high ATR’s.
Tax Progressivity Derived from Individual Revenue Sources
The Suits Index approach (Suits, 1977) estimates tax progressivities for individual tax
types, and then uses the state’s revenue structure to obtain a state-specific overall, weighted-
average progressivity. Thus, if sales taxes are regressive and income taxes are progressive, a
state that disproportionately relies on sales taxes should be more regressive than a state that
disproportionately relies on income taxes. An example of this approach is McIntyre et al.
(2003).
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We compare our MTR-ATR Progressivity rankings with those calculated by McIntyre et
al. (2003), shown in Column (6) of TABLE 8. There is very little correspondence. Our
Progressivity calculations show that the number of progressive and regressive states is
approximately equal. In contrast, McIntyre et al. (2003) conclude that 44 of the 50 states are
regressive. The Spearman’s rank correlation between the two rankings is 0.174. The Kendall’s
 rank correlation coefficient is 0.131. The null hypothesis that the two rankings are
independent fails to be rejected at p-values below 0.15. This is evidence that the two rankings
are not compatible.
Implications of Progressivity Rankings
If we think of progressivity as a measure of tax incidence, with tax liability on high
earners disproportionately increasing with progressivity, then the McIntyre et al. (2003) rankings
are more believable. For example, they rank Delaware, California, Montana, Oregon, and Maine
as the most progressive states. All but California have no sales tax, which is generally regarded
as the most regressive revenue source. The 5 most regressive states are Washington, Florida,
Nevada, Wyoming, and South Dakota. These have no personal income taxes, which is generally
regarded as a progressive revenue source.
Although likely not a reliable measure of tax incidence, the MTR-ATR measure of
progressivity is nonetheless informative. By this measure, a progressive state is one whose Tax
Burden increases with income. Among other things, this means that the state and local
government sector will grow relatively larger as that state’s income increases. This may have
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important consequences for economic growth and the ability of the public sector to provide
government services to its taxpaying constituents.26
There is another consequence of note: A number of studies report finding a negative
correlation between state incomes and tax burdens (e.g. Reed, 2008). While these studies
typically interpret causality from taxes to economic growth, an alternative hypothesis is that the
causality runs the other direction – from income to tax burden. If state tax systems are
predominantly regressive, then increases in income would be associated with decreases in
average tax rates, or Tax Burdens. The Progressivity results reported in TABLE 9 do not
provide support for this alternative interpretation. According to the MTR-ATR measure, state tax
systems are evenly split between progressive and regressive tax structures, with many very close
to being proportional. Thus, whatever the source of the negative correlation between state
economic growth and average tax rates, it is not likely to be a manifestation of an underlying
regressive tax system.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a procedure for estimating time-varying state marginal tax rates
(MTR’s). It does so by appending the time-invariant procedure of Koester and Kormendi (1987)
with state tax policy variables. We apply our procedure to panel data covering all fifty states
over the years 1977-2004.
We find that MTR’s vary widely across states and years, ranging from a low of 7.9% to a
high of 15.2%. Using data from the last five years of our panel (2000-2004), we rank individual
states on the basis of their MTR’s. The top five states (in descending order) are New York,
26 Van Wychen (2008) explains that progressive tax systems may lead to more generous funding for public
infrastructure and services than more regressive systems.
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Maine, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. The states with the smallest MTR’s are Alaska,
Wyoming, Tennessee, South Dakota, and Alabama.
All of the tax types other than corporate income taxes make a substantial contribution to
the level of state MTR’s. In contrast, annual changes in MTR’s are primarily driven by statutory
changes in personal income taxes and, to a lesser degree, by sales and property taxes. A benefit
of our procedure is that it allows us to connect time-series movement in our estimated MTR’s to
actual changes in state tax policy parameters.
Two proxies for state MTR’s that have been employed in economic growth studies are (i)
the top marginal income tax bracket and (ii) changes in state Tax Burdens. We find that the first
is moderately correlated with our estimated MTR’s, while the latter performs very poorly as a
proxy.
Lastly, using a MTR-ATR measure of state tax progressivity, we find that states are
evenly split between progressive and regressive tax systems, with most states roughly
approximating proportional state tax systems. However, there is little correspondence between
this measure of progressivity and more traditional measures based on tax incidences (cf.
McIntyre et al. 2003). We conclude that the MTR-ATR measure is useful, but should not be
interpreted as characterizing the distributional consequences of the tax burden for individual
states.
Our study can be extended in a number of ways. We highlight two main directions.
First, time-varying, state-specific MTR’s estimated using our procedure can be employed in
panel data studies of economic growth. Among other potential benefits, this line of research may
help to assess whether negative growth effects associated with taxes are a true tax effect, or a
“size of government” phenomenon. Second, our procedure lends itself to a number of
22
refinements leading to more reliable estimates of MTR’s. In particular, future research could
extend our work by further addressing endogeneity and equation specification issues.
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TABLE 1
State and Local Tax Revenue Shares by Type, 1977-2004a
REVENUE TYPE
Personal Income Tax Corporate Income Tax Sales Tax Property Tax Other
Mean 18.5% 4.3% 23.5% 30.3% 23.3%
Maximum 43.5% 34.8% 49.3% 70.0% 69.7%
Minimum 0 0 0 11.1% 9.9%
a There are only 1300 state-year observations because state and local fiscal data are not reported for 2001 and 2003.
SOURCE: The tax and revenue data come from US Census Government Finances Historical Data.
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TABLE 2
Statutory Tax Variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
I. Personal Income Tax (PIT)
MTR_WAGES Average Marginal Tax Rate on wage income
MTR_INTEREST Average Marginal Tax Rate on interest income
MTR_DIVIDENDS Average Marginal Tax Rate on dividend income
MTR_CAPGAINS Average Marginal Tax Rate on capital gains income
MTR_MORTGAGE Average Marginal Tax Rate on mortgage interest paid(subsidies shown as negative tax rates)
MTR_PENSION Average Marginal Tax Rate on pension income
MAX_WAGES Maximum statutory tax rate on wage income
MAX_CAPGAINS Maximum statutory tax rate on long-term capital gainsincome
NBER TAXSIM (AMTR-N95) Model
II. Corporate Income Tax (CIT)
MAX_CRATE Maximum statutory tax rate on corporate profits
NUMBER_CBRACKETS Number of corporate income tax brackets
Compiled by the Federation of Tax
Administrators from various sources.
Authors reconciled data with OTPR-
University of Michigan, World Tax
Database and Council of State
Government’s Book of States series.
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
III. Sales Tax (ST)
RATE_SALES State-level sales tax rate
RATE_FOOD State-level tax rate on food
EXTENT_SERVICESTAXED Number of service categories taxed (out of 164)
EXTENT_MACHINERY1 Dummy variable indicating partial taxation of machinery
EXTENT_MACHINERY2 Dummy variable indicating full taxation of machinery
(1977-2002) OTPR- University of
Michigan, World Tax Database ;
(2003-2004) Compiled by the
Federation of Tax Administrators from
various sources ;
(1977-1991) Author’s search in state
statutes of changes in status of service
taxation ;
(1992-2004) Taxed services compiled
by the Federation of Tax Administrators
from various sources ;
(1982-1993) Taxation of machinery
compiled by Due and Mikesell
(1983,1994) ;
(1977-1981 and 1994-2004) Taxation of
machinery compiled from state statutes,
Tax Foundation-Tax Review (various
years), and Council of State
Governments, Book of the States
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
IV. Property Tax (PT)
RATE_PROPERTY Property tax rate per assessed value Assessment ratio(largest city in state)
LIMIT_ASSESSGROWTH Dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a limit on thegrowth rate of assessed value
LIMIT_SPECIFICRATE Dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is are specificproperty tax limits
LIMIT_REVGROWTH Dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a limit on thegrowth of property taxes
(1977-2004) DC Office of Revenue
Analysisa ;
(1977-1995) ACIR Report, Tax and
Expenditure Limits on Local
Governments;
(1996-2004) Nathan Anderson,
University of Illinois-Chicago;
(1996-2004) Author’s search in state
statutes of changes in status of property
taxation ;
V. Other Tax (OT)
No variables
a The data were collected from the DC Office of the Chief Financial Officer. Documentation of the methodology is available at
“http://cof.dc.gov/ “. The residential property tax rates were collected from local assessors and state equalization boards. Prior to 1981 residential
property tax rates were collected from the 30 largest cities in the entire US. Data for 1983 and 1989 were not available.
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TABLE 3
Summary of Regression Results for Individual Tax Revenue Equations
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT PROB
Personal Income Tax Equation
MTR_WAGES INCOME 0.003946 5.98 0.000
MTR_CAPGAINS INCOME 0.000145 0.47 0.638
MTR_MORTGAGE INCOME 0.000271 0.64 0.521
R-squared = 0.994
Adjusted R-squared = 0.993
Total observations = 1118
Corporate Income Tax Equation
NUMBER_CBRACKETS INCOME -0.000410 -2.03 0.042
MAX_CRATE INCOME 0.000800 2.19 0.029
R-squared = 0.976
Adjusted R-squared = 0.974
Total observations = 1196
Sales Tax Equation
RATE_SALES INCOME 0.003008 5.28 0.000
RATE_FOOD INCOME 0.000060 0.18 0.854
R-squared = 0.997
Adjusted R-squared = 0.997
Total observations = 1170
Property Tax Equation
RATE_PROPERTY INCOME 0.000904 1.16 0.244
R-squared = 0.992
Adjusted R-squared = 0.991
Total observations = 1130
NOTE: The table only reports the TAX VARIABLE INCOME interaction variables
because these are the only tax variables that matter for the calculation of MTR’s. All
regression specifications also include state dummy and state dummy INCOME
interaction effects. Regressions are estimated using Weighted Least Squares, with
weights set equal to the reciprocal of the square root of INCOME. Standard errors are
robust to serial correlation. The R-squared and Adjusted R-squared values are those
from the unweighted regression equations.
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TABLE 4
A. Histogram and Associated Summary Statistics of Estimated MTR’s
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Mean 10.45%
Median 10.28%
Maximum 15.23%
Minimum 7.93%
Std. Dev. 1.32%
B. Decomposition of Estimated MTR’s by Revenue Source
REVENUE SOURCE MEAN (IN PERCENT) SHARE OF TOTAL MTR
Personal Income Tax 2.30 21%
Corporate Income Tax 0.32 3%
Sales Tax 2.43 23%
Property Tax 3.18 30%
Other Tax 2.22 22%
C. Absolute Value of Annual Changes in Estimated MTR’s by Revenue
Source
REVENUE SOURCE MEAN (IN PERCENT) MEDIAN (IN PERCENT)
TaxIncomeΔPersonal 0.051 0.017
TaxIncomeΔCorporate 0.006 0.000
TaxΔSales 0.018 0.000
TaxΔProperty 0.015 0.006
TaxΔOther 0.000 0.000
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TABLE 5
Estimated MTR’s by State
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TABLE 6
Time Series of the MTR_WAGES and RATE_SALES Variables for Selected States
CONNECTICUT ILLINOIS KENTUCKY NORTH CAROLINAYEAR
MTR_WAGES RATE_SALES MTR_WAGES RATE_SALES MTR_WAGES RATE_SALES
1977 0.02 4.00 3.27 5.00 4.06 3.00
1978 0.00 4.00 3.31 5.00 4.22 3.00
1979 0.01 4.00 3.45 5.00 4.37 3.00
1980 0.00 4.00 3.46 5.00 4.45 3.00
1981 0.01 4.00 3.47 5.00 4.59 3.00
1982 0.01 4.00 3.62 5.00 4.59 3.00
1983 0.04 4.00 3.77 5.00 4.69 3.00
1984 0.02 5.00 3.82 5.00 4.82 3.00
1985 0.03 5.00 3.81 5.00 4.88 3.00
1986 0.06 5.00 3.81 5.00 4.92 3.00
1987 0.14 5.00 4.10 5.00 5.03 3.00
1988 0.06 5.00 4.23 5.00 5.08 3.00
1989 0.12 5.00 4.24 5.00 6.31 3.00
1990 0.07 6.25 3.99 5.00 6.34 3.00
1991 1.62 6.25 5.03 6.00 6.74 3.00
1992 4.59 6.25 5.02 6.00 6.79 4.00
1993 4.56 6.25 5.07 6.00 6.81 4.00
1994 4.57 6.25 5.08 6.00 6.86 4.00
1995 5.22 6.25 5.12 6.00 6.88 4.00
1996 5.08 6.25 5.18 6.00 6.91 4.00
1997 5.00 6.25 5.17 6.00 6.93 4.00
1998 4.99 6.25 5.22 6.00 7.16 4.00
1999 4.79 6.25 5.21 6.00 7.10 4.00
2000 4.94 6.25 5.25 6.00 7.15 4.00
2001 4.88 6.25 5.23 6.00 7.24 4.00
2002 5.01 6.25 5.19 6.00 7.22 4.00
2003 5.49 6.25 5.23 6.00 7.21 4.50
2004 5.33 6.25 5.26 6.00 7.26 4.50
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TABLE 7
Correlations Between Estimated MTR’s and
(i) Top Marginal Income Tax Rate and (ii) Change in Tax Burden
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Not Adjusted for Fixed Effects Adjusted for Fixed Effects
Top Marginal Income Tax Rate
(MAX_WAGES) 0.619 0.524
∆Tax Burden 0.046 0.083
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TABLE 8
Estimated MTR’s and Tax Progressivities by State (2000-2004)
STATE
(1)
MTR
(2)
RANK
(3)
PROGRESSIVITY
(4)
RANK
(5)
RANK
(McIntyre et al., 2003)
(6)
Alabama 8.91 46 100.93 31 42
Alaska 8.01 50 71.73 49 16
Arizona 10.38 27 99.72 36 37
Arkansas 10.69 23 104.08 14 25
California 10.58 25 96.71 47 2
Colorado 9.25 44 99.49 41 34
Connecticut 11.92 6 108.15 3 38
Delaware 11.23 13 105.04 11 1
Florida 10.04 37 104.87 12 49
Georgia 10.31 30 101.81 28 29
Hawaii 12.50 3 103.35 20 33
Idaho 10.88 17 105.12 10 8
Illinois 10.03 38 97.09 46 41
Indiana 10.85 19 106.67 6 35
Iowa 10.32 29 98.50 42 22
Kansas 10.79 21 101.52 29 23
Kentucky 11.19 14 105.82 8 18
Louisiana 10.37 28 94.89 48 39
Maine 14.00 2 108.06 4 5
Maryland 10.18 33 98.11 44 14
Massachusetts 9.95 39 98.14 43 27
Michigan 10.88 16 102.75 21 36
Minnesota 11.74 8 103.52 15 11
Mississippi 10.78 22 102.64 23 31
Missouri 9.92 41 103.42 17 19
Montana 10.13 35 102.01 26 3
Nebraska 10.97 15 99.62 38 7
Nevada 10.14 34 100.62 32 48
New Hampshire 8.99 45 105.35 9 43
New Jersey 11.46 10 106.93 5 17
New Mexico 12.46 4 108.54 2 21
New York 14.11 1 103.37 19 26
North Carolina 10.30 31 101.40 30 13
North Dakota 10.64 24 99.52 40 30
Ohio 11.37 11 102.74 22 10
Oklahoma 9.93 40 100.02 34 28
Oregon 10.52 26 109.78 1 4
Pennsylvania 10.29 32 100.05 33 40
Rhode Island 11.80 7 103.39 18 20
South Carolina 10.09 36 102.07 25 9
South Dakota 8.79 47 98.08 45 46
Tennessee 8.55 48 99.69 37 45
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Texas 9.69 43 102.61 24 44
Utah 10.86 18 99.74 35 32
Vermont 11.36 12 99.61 39 6
Virginia 9.83 42 101.98 27 15
Washington 10.82 20 106.33 7 50
West Virginia 11.61 9 104.62 13 12
Wisconsin 12.38 5 103.52 16 24
Wyoming 8.40 49 69.91 50 47
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TABLE 9
Histogram and Associated Summary Statistics of Tax Progressivities
A. All States and Years
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APPENDIX
Summary Statistics
VARIABLES OBS MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM STDEV
EXTENT_MACHINERY1 1300 0.17 0 1 0.38
EXTENT_MACHINERY2 1300 0.25 0 1 0.43
EXTENT_SERVICESTAXED 1300 46.1 0 160 39.4
LIMIT_ASSESSMENTGROWTH 1300 0.13 0 1 0.34
LIMIT_REVGROWTH 1300 0.45 0 1 0.50
LIMIT_SPECIFICRATE 1300 0.56 0 1 0.50
MAX_CAPGAINS 1300 4.21 0 16.37 3.03
MAX_CRATE 1300 6.47 0 12.25 2.95
MAX_WAGES 1300 5.22 0 19.8 3.41
MTR_CAPGAINS 1300 3.77 0 14.87 2.71
MTR_DIVIDENDS 1300 4.60 0 11.15 2.54
MTR_INTEREST 1300 4.15 -0.07 10.9 2.34
MTR_MORTGAGE 1300 -3.40 -9.45 1.28 2.85
MTR_PENSION 1300 3.38 -0.68 8.87 2.50
MTR_WAGE 1300 4.20 0 9.76 2.54
NUMBER_CBRACKETS 1300 1.78 0 10 1.85
RATE_FOOD 1300 1.55 0 7.00 2.08
RATE_PROPERTY 1130 1.76 0.3 7.87 0.94
RATE_SALES 1300 4.25 0 8.00 1.77
TAXES_CINCOME 1300 462,979 0 6,925,916 887,027
TAXES_PINCOME 1300 2,137,560 0 39,574,649 3,944,435
TAXES_PROPERTY 1300 3,107,940 78,221 34,499,304 4,516,354
TAXES_SALES 1300 2,429,041 0 34,283,279 3,624,823
TAXES_TOTAL 1300 10,119,074 389,039 133,893,624 14,540,798
Y 1300 94,966,663 2,892,750 1,223,301,000 129,605,026
